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 STORIES OF CRIMES, TRIALS, AND 
APPEALS IN CIVIL WAR ERA MISSOURI 
 
FRANK O. BOWMAN, III* 
I.  A LYNCHING IN BOONE COUNTY 
Near dark on Friday, August 12, 1853, in Columbia, Missouri, Miss 
Nancy Hubbard, a fifteen-year-old white girl, was returning from a funeral 
with her older married sister, Mrs. Mary Jacobs, and her little daughter 
Amanda.
1
  Miss Hubbard dismounted from her horse to open a gate when, so 
she said, a completely naked black man jumped out of a thicket and attempted 
to rape her.
2
  According to Miss Hubbard, she struggled with her attacker for 
ten minutes and succeeded in fighting off the assailant, who fled.  The 
commotion spooked Mrs. Jacobs‘ horse, which threw her and her daughter.  
The daughter ran to the house of a neighbor, who dashed to the scene to find 
Miss Hubbard and Mrs. Jacobs, but no assailant.
3
  The locals seized and then 
released a number of black men as suspects before settling on Hiram, a slave, 
as Miss Hubbard‘s attacker.4 
Hiram was brought before two local justices of the peace, John Ellis and 
Walter C. Maupin,
5
 who sat in Cedar Township,
6
 a section of Boone County 
 
* Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law.  This Article could not have been 
written without the laborious digging in historical sources performed by my tireless research 
assistants, Bradley Dixon, Mark Ellebracht, Michael Henderson, Michael Spillane, and Scott Snipkie, 
as well as the resources and advice provided by John Dethman of the University of Missouri Law 
Library and the staffs of the Missouri State Archives and the Western Historical Manuscripts 
Collection at the University of Missouri. 
1. WILLIAM F. SWITZLER, HISTORY OF BOONE COUNTY, MISSOURI 371 (St. Louis, Nixon–
Jones Printing Co. 1882); see also NORTH TODD GENTRY, THE BENCH AND BAR OF BOONE COUNTY 
MISSOURI 253 (1916). 
2. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 371.  Ever since I first read about this incident, the victim‘s 
account of the assault has seemed highly implausible.  Even supposing a black man in pre-Civil War 
Missouri were to be suicidal enough to attempt the rape of a white girl in the daytime in front of 
witnesses, the claim that the attacker was lurking in the bushes in the nude takes the affair from the 
deeply improbable to the completely fantastic.  Whatever the truth, the white community of 
Columbia took Miss Hubbard‘s tale in deadly earnest. 
3. Id. at 371–72. 
4. Id. at 372. 
5. Id. 
6. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 72 (identifying Ellis and Maupin as justices of the peace for Cedar 
Township). 
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just south of Columbia proper.
7
  The JPs conducted a factual inquiry, 
characterized in one source as a ―trial,‖8 and discharged Hiram.9  However, 
the citizenry was not satisfied with that outcome, and on Tuesday, August 16, 
1853, someone obtained and executed a warrant for Hiram‘s arrest from 
Justice of the Peace Thomas Porter,
10
 who sat in Columbia Township.
11
  On 
Saturday, August 20, Hiram appeared in the Columbia courthouse before yet 
another justice of the peace, David Gordon, and Columbia Recorder 
Francis T. Russell.
12
  Although again called a ―trial‖ by lay chroniclers of the 
period,
13
 it is unclear whether the courthouse proceeding was a trial on the 
merits or only a probable cause hearing.  A felony charge, even when brought 
against a slave, was not cognizable by a justice of the peace and could only be 
tried on the merits by the circuit court judge,
14
 who at the time was William 
A. Hall.
15
  However, if the charge against Hiram was limited to attempted 
rape, the penalty for attempted rape of a white female by a negro was 
 
7. Illustrated Historical Atlas of Boone County, Missouri (1875), reproduced on inside cover of 
SWITZLER, supra note 1. 
8. See id. at 372.  It is not clear what sort of legal proceeding Justices Ellis and Maupin 
conducted.  If the offense suspected was a felony, justices of the peace lacked jurisdiction to try such 
a case on the merits.  See Justices‘ Courts §§ 2, 9, Mo. Rev. Stat. 372–73 (1835).  But see infra notes 
16–17 and accompanying text on the question of whether the charges against Hiram would have 
constituted a felony.  Justices of the peace were empowered to issue arrest warrants and to examine a 
person accused by warrant of a felony and the evidence against him to determine whether probable 
cause existed to bind him over for trial.  Justices‘ Courts §§ 3–5, Mo. Rev. Stat. 372–73 (1835) 
(authorizing justices of the peace to issue warrants for criminal offenses); §§ 8–9 (setting forth the 
procedure for examining a defendant and evidence against him to determine whether the defendant 
should be bound over for trial in the circuit court).  No warrant had been issued for Hiram‘s arrest at 
the time, so the proceeding may have been a sort of informal hybrid essentially aimed at determining 
whether probable cause existed to hold and charge Hiram. 
9. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372.  An interesting sidelight on the weakness of the case against 
Hiram appears from the fact that Justice of the Peace Ellis was ousted from his office in 1861 for 
refusal to take the required oath of loyalty to the Union.  GENTRY, supra note 1, at 265.  One may 
reasonably assume that he was not a secret abolitionist or disposed to be unduly generous in  his 
assessment of charges against the town‘s slave population.  
10. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372.   
11. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 73. 
12. Switzler characterizes Gordon as a justice of the peace and Russell as recorder of 
Columbia, SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372, but both men were justices of the peace of Columbia 
Township at one time, GENTRY, supra note 1, at 73.  David Gordon later served five terms as a 
county court judge, beginning in 1863; he died in office in 1875.  Id. at 67.  Francis T. Russell was a 
substantial citizen of Columbia.  Among other things, he served as a curator of the University of 
Missouri and was integrally involved in creating a faculty of law at the university.  SWITZLER, supra 
note 1, at 231, 298, 300. 
13. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372. 
14. See supra note 8; see also State v. Gilbert, 24 Mo. 380, 381 (1857) (noting that, while a 
misdemeanor charge against a slave is triable by a justice of the peace, a felony proceeding against a 
slave must be instituted by indictment in the ordinary way). 
15. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 62. 
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castration rather than death or imprisonment,
16
 and the Missouri Supreme 
Court had held in 1844 that this crime was not a felony.
17
  Whatever the 
technical character of the proceeding, both defendant Hiram and the State 
were represented by counsel.  Hiram‘s owner, Edward Young, retained 
James S. Rollins and Samuel A. Young to represent him.
18
  The case was 
prosecuted by Odon Guitar.
19
  Rollins and Guitar, in particular, were or would 
later become men of note. 
James S. Rollins was born in Kentucky in 1812, and educated in 
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Indiana.  He not only ―read law‖ under a 
prominent practitioner, but somewhat unusually for the time, also graduated 
from a law school.
20
  He entered practice in Columbia, Missouri, in 1834, was 
elected to the state legislature as a representative in 1838 and 1840, and 
served as state senator from 1846 to 1850.
21
  He was the (unsuccessful) Whig 
candidate for governor in 1848, and the leading (though again unsuccessful) 
Whig candidate for U.S. Senate in the same period.
22
  By the time of Hiram‘s 
arrest in 1853, Rollins had also been a newspaper owner and editor, real estate 
speculator, and railroad booster.
23
  In 1854, Rollins was again elected state 
representative, and in 1857 he lost the race for Missouri governor by only 230 
votes.
24
  Although a significant slave owner himself,
25
 Rollins opposed 
extension of slavery to the territories
26
 (by no means a popular view in 
 
16. Nathan v. State, 8 Mo. 631, 632 (1844). 
17. Id. 
18. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372. 
19. Id. 
20. Rollins attended Washington College, Pennsylvania, for three years, transferred to and 
graduated from Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, in 1830, read law for two years with a 
practitioner, and then attended and graduated from Transylvania Law School in Lexington, 
Kentucky, in 1834.  Id. at 934. 
21. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 51, 53. 
22. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935.  At the time, U.S. Senators were selected by the state 
legislature and not by popular vote.  See Senators—United States, ch. 147, § 1, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1460 
(1856), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=MTETltYSr-EC&dq=Revised+Statutes+ 
of+the+State+of+Missouri+1835&source=gbs_navlinks_s.  Rollins‘ candidacy for the Senate 
occurred within the legislature and indicated his stature in the legislative wing of the Whig party.  
23. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 934; 2 WALTER B. STEVENS, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF 
MISSOURI (THE CENTER STATE): ONE HUNDRED YEARS IN THE UNION 1820–1921, at 801 (1921). 
24. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935; WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH, JAMES SIDNEY ROLLINS 28 
(New York, DeVinne Press 1891).  Another source puts the margin of defeat at 334 votes.  The Late 
Elections in Missouri, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1857, at 4. 
25. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 936–37.  One source maintains that Rollins held thirty-four 
slaves at his home in Columbia in 1860.  Missouri‘s Little Dixie, 
http://littledixie.net/Slave%20Housing.htm (last visited June 7, 2010).  Another claims he was one of 
the largest slave owners in the entire state.  2 STEVENS, supra note 23, at 704. 
26. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935.  Rollins‘ views on slavery were convoluted.  He owned 
slaves, but seems to have viewed the institution as an evil.  He opposed the extension of slavery to 
the territories as a matter of policy, id., but appears to have supported the ―popular sovereignty‖ 
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antebellum central Missouri), and as the threat of southern secession loomed 
in 1860, Rollins placed himself firmly in the unionist camp.
27
 
The tension between Rollins‘ economic interests as a wealthy owner of 
real and human property and his allegiance to the federal Union was a 
microcosm of the stresses tearing at Missouri generally and Boone County in 
particular in the late 1850s.  Missouri was the only slave state north of the 
Mason–Dixon line and west of the Mississippi.  Boone County, situated 
roughly thirty miles north of the state capital of Jefferson City and in the 
agricultural zone created by the flow of the Missouri River across the state 
from Kansas City to its junction with the Mississippi at St. Louis, was a part 
of ―Little Dixie,‖ so-called because it was settled primarily by immigrants 
from the slave South who brought with them their peculiar institution and the 
peculiar culture built around it.
28
  By 1860, Boone County had the third-
largest number of slaves among the state‘s 114 counties, with 5,034.29  On the 
other hand, Columbia, the Boone County seat, being close to the capital and 
home to the state university, was a relatively cosmopolitan place for the time 
and its leading citizens were not unaware that the state‘s economic future was 
tied just as closely to the urbanizing and industrializing northern states as to 
the slave South. When the secession crisis broke in 1861, the governor, 
Claiborne Fox Jackson, and the state legislature tried to take Missouri into the 
Confederacy.  After a series of pitched battles between pro-Union and pro-
Confederate citizen armies, the secessionist governor and legislators were run 
out of the state and Missouri‘s allegiance to the Union was precariously 
upheld.
30
 
 
approach of allowing the citizens of each prospective state to choose whether slavery should be 
permitted, id. at 381 (recounting the events of an 1855 public meeting in Boone County called to 
debate the events in Kansas, in which Rollins supported resolutions endorsing the popular 
sovereignty approach of the Kansas–Nebraska Act and opposed resolutions that, in effect, supported 
extension of slavery into the territories regardless of the views of the inhabitants).  A possible 
indicator of Rollins‘ personal views on slavery is an 1860 letter to William F. Switzler in Rollins‘ 
papers, and apparently in his hand, noting that the author is ―opposed to all kinds of human 
merchandise‖ and observing that the Founders viewed slavery as a ―cankerous ulcer, baleful to the 
body politic where ever it existed,‖ but implicitly defending the constitutional right of states to adopt 
or reject slavery within their own boundaries.  Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University 
of Missouri, Collection No. C1026, file 191 (on file with author). 
27. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935.     
28. T.J. STILES, JESSE JAMES: LAST REBEL OF THE CIVIL WAR 10–11 (2002). 
29. Slaves in Missouri in 1860, HOWARD COUNTY ADVERTISER, Jan. 9, 1903, available at 
http://www.usgennet.org/usa/mo/topic/afro-amer/slavesinmo.html.  Howard County, which adjoins 
Boone to the west along the Missouri River, had the second-largest slave population in 1860, with 
5,886.  Id. 
30. This two-sentence summary of the events in Missouri at the outset of the Civil War is a 
tremendous oversimplification of a complex history.  For the full story, see 3 WILLIAM E. PARRISH,  
A HISTORY OF MISSOURI 1–86 (1973). 
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In 1860, Rollins, a unionist Whig, was elected to the first of two terms in 
the U.S. House of Representatives, serving from 1861 to 1864.
31
  After the 
Civil War, he returned to civic activism and state politics, securing election to 
the Missouri state senate in 1868.
32
  While there, he was instrumental in 
ensuring that the University of Missouri, which opened in 1841 but had fallen 
on hard times during the war,
33
 would remain in Columbia.
34
  As a result, 
Rollins is known as the ―Father of the University of Missouri.‖35  Throughout 
his long, successful, and lucrative career,
36
 Rollins continued to practice law 
in both criminal and civil matters, though he was known to fret that the 
routine of law practice did not give adequate scope to a man with broad 
interests and ambitions.
37
 
Odon Guitar, Hiram‘s prosecutor, was fifteen years younger than Rollins, 
having been born in Madison County, Kentucky, in 1827.
38
  His parents 
moved to Boone County, Missouri, when he was two, and Guitar lived in 
central Missouri for the rest of his life.  He graduated from the University of 
Missouri in 1846, departing even before his degree was conferred to join 
American forces in the Mexican War.
39
  Upon his return, Guitar read law with 
his uncle, John B. Gordon,
40
 and was admitted to the bar in 1848.
41
  Like 
many young lawyers, Guitar sought to gain experience and a reputation by 
serving as a prosecutor.  In 1852, he became the Boone County attorney, 
succeeding Rollins, and he held that office when Hiram was arrested.
42
  Like 
Rollins, Guitar was both a slaveholder
43
 and an ardent unionist.
44
  When the 
 
31. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935, 937. 
32. Id. at 937; see also GENTRY, supra note 1, at 53. 
33. See JAMES OLSON & VERA OLSON, THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY 6–7 (1988). 
34. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 937. 
35. OLSON & OLSON, supra note 33, at 3 (describing Rollins‘ contributions to the rescue of the 
university and noting that in 1872, the board of curators of the university recognized him formally as 
―Pater Universitatis Missouriensis‖). 
36. In 1858, Rollins had the second-highest tax bill in Boone County, second only to Eli Bass.  
By 1881, Rollins was the largest taxpayer in the county.  SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 392.   
37. ―Major Rollins, of Boone County, was a member of the bar, but, like [Thomas Hart] 
Benton, preferred political to a professional life . . . .‖  John W. Henry, Personal Recollections, in 
THE HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI 388 (A.J.D. Stewart ed., St. Louis, The Legal 
Publishing Co. 1898) [hereinafter BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI]. 
38. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877. 
39. Id. 
40. Id.  Gordon was a prominent Columbia attorney who served five terms in the Missouri 
legislature.  GENTRY, supra note 1, at 51. 
41. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877. 
42. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 54.  James Rollins was Boone County attorney from 1848 to 
1852.  Guitar took over the office in 1852 and held it until the middle of the Civil War in 1863.  Id. 
43. Guitar is said to have owned seven household slaves in 1860.  Missouri‘s Little Dixie, 
supra note 25. 
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war broke out, Guitar was commissioned by the unionist governor, Hamilton 
Gamble,
45
 to recruit a regiment of volunteers for federal service.  He became, 
in effect, the military commandant of central Missouri (and sometimes of 
other sections), and by the close of the war held the rank of brigadier general 
of volunteers and of the Missouri State Militia.
46
  After the war, General 
Guitar (as he was ever after called) returned to law practice, and served two 
terms in the Missouri legislature.
47
  Guitar‘s private practice was primarily 
criminal, and he seemed to have a particular affinity for murder cases.  He is 
reputed to have defended over 140 homicides, and several sources claim that 
only one of his clients was ever hung, and only five ever went to prison.
48
  We 
will discuss one of his few failures presently.
49
 
On Saturday, August 20, 1853, when Hiram was brought to court, the 
courthouse was packed with agitated spectators and a crowd had gathered 
outside.  At about 3:00 p.m., some of the people outside rushed the courtroom 
and tried to drag Hiram out to hang him.  They got a rope over his neck, 
which Rollins managed to cut once, but another was put around him and he 
was dragged out to a nearby wood.  Rollins followed the mob, stood before 
them, and implored them to return Hiram to official custody for a fair trial.
50
  
Such was his eloquence that, amazingly, the mob gave the defendant back to 
the sheriff.
51
 
 
44. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877. 
45. 3 PARRISH, supra note 30, at 31 (describing Gamble‘s appointment as Missouri governor in 
1861 by a state convention). 
46. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877–78.  See also THE BENCH AND BAR OF ST. LOUIS, KANSAS 
CITY, JEFFERSON CITY, AND OTHER MISSOURI CITIES 221 (Chicago, Am. Biographical Publ‘g Co. 
1884) [hereinafter BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES].   
47. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 878. 
48. Id. at 879; BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 221.  However, this 
version of Guitar‘s record seems to involve a little selective counting.  We know of at least four men 
he represented who were hung—John Chapman, a white man whose case we will consider presently, 
see infra Part II.B, Joe Robinson, a slave executed for murder in 1857, see SWITZLER, supra note 1, 
at 388, and the Underwood brothers, tried and executed in Macon County in 1873, see 4 STEVENS, 
supra note 23, at 279.  Perhaps since Mr. Robinson confessed and had ―no defence to make,‖ 
SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 388, the chroniclers only counted clients who went to trial, or more 
distressingly, as a slave, perhaps Robinson simply was not considered a real client.  As for the 
Underwoods, it may be that the events in Macon County made little impression on Guitar‘s admirers 
back home in Columbia.  Still, everybody agreed that Odon Guitar was a great criminal defense 
lawyer. 
49. See infra Part II.B. 
50. Rollins‘ appeal to the mob was apparently supported by William Switzler, the editor of the 
Weekly Missouri Statesman newspaper, as well as several other prominent local citizens.  See Negro 
Hung for Attempted Rape, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 1853, at 3. 
51. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372–73.  A rather different account of the affair appears in 
GENTRY, supra note 1, at 117.  Gentry relates the story of the mob storming the courtroom, Rollins 
cutting the rope, his appeal to the mob, and the initial return of the prisoner to jail.  However, he 
bowdlerizes the story‘s ghastly end by reporting that, due to Rollins‘ eloquent intervention, mob 
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The next day, Sunday, August 21, while in custody, Hiram—according to 
period accounts—confessed.52  Monday the trial resumed, but the confession 
had the perverse effect of increasing mob agitation for summary justice.  
Odon Guitar, the prosecutor, and Rollins‘ co-counsel, Colonel Samuel Young, 
addressed the crowd, appealed for calm, and urged them to do whatever they 
were going to do ―decently and in order.‖53  They may also have urged the 
mob to disperse, but if so, that part of their plea does not come down to us.  
So, outside the courthouse, the mob convened a meeting and, incredibly, 
elected a chairman, Eli Bass, one of the largest plantation owners and 
slaveholders in Boone County.
54
  The question before the meeting was not 
whether Hiram should be killed, but how—should he be hanged or burnt?55  
Mr. Bass put the question to a vote.  Those in favor of hanging prevailed by a 
large margin.  The mob then appointed a committee, chaired by George N. 
King,
56
 charged with securing a rope, a cart, and a coffin, and with breaking 
into the jail to remove the prisoner and hang him ―decently and in order.‖57  
Over the protest of the sheriff, they did so, took Hiram to a nearby grove and 
 
violence was averted.  It was, but only temporarily. 
52. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373.  One is suspicious of this highly convenient confession and 
disposed to wonder what methods were employed to secure it.  Even in antebellum Missouri, a 
confession obtained by force, even from a slave, was inadmissible evidence.  Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 
135, 136 (1829) (excluding a confession to burglary obtained from the defendant, an African-
American slave, by flogging him).   
53. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373. 
54. Id.  In his account of the affair, Switzler refers to Bass as ―one of our most respectable and 
influential citizens.‖  Id.  Bass owned large tracts of land south of Columbia, considerable livestock, 
id. at 747, numerous slaves, and was in 1858 the largest taxpayer in Boone County, id. at 392.  He 
was arguably the leading citizen of Boone County and of prewar central Missouri.  For example, he 
was on the first Board of Curators of the University of Missouri in 1839.  Id. at 261.  During the war, 
Bass‘s political views seem to have shifted to accommodate changing military and political tides.  He 
appeared at a pro-secessionist meeting in April 1861, id. at 405, but in a unionist meeting on July 18, 
1863, Switzler commended Bass‘s vote at the Missouri state convention in favor of emancipation of 
the slaves in Missouri, id. at 432.  
55. Id. at 373.  Burning slaves accused of crimes against whites was apparently the brutal 
fashion of the time.  On August 12, 1853, the same day the attempted rape of Miss Hubbard allegedly 
occurred, a Columbia newspaper reported that the citizens of Carthage, Missouri, had seized from the 
sheriff‘s custody two slaves convicted of killing a white man, taken them into the countryside, and 
burned them.  See Negroes Burnt at Carthage, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, Aug. 12, 1853, at 3. 
56. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373.  We know little about Mr. King other than that he left 
Boone County to join the California gold rush in 1850, id. at 361–62, but he had apparently returned 
by 1853.  Given the prevalence of vigilantism in the gold camps, perhaps King brought his 
enthusiasm for mob law back with him from California.  Remarkably, we also know the names of the 
other members of the duly appointed lynching committee, which were published in the local 
newspaper.  They were Henry Wilkinson, John Ballinger, William Breakey, William B. Cato, John 
Robinett, John Hume, William Hubbard, A.R. Vest, and R.P. Waters.  Id. at 374; Negro Hung for 
Attempted Rape, supra note 50. 
57. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373. 
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hung him.
58
 
Obviously there would be no appeal for Hiram, at least in the courts of 
this world, so why does an article in a symposium devoted to criminal appeals 
open with an account of so disgraceful and savage a distortion of the legal 
process?  The tale serves at least two introductory functions.  First, it 
illustrates that in Missouri before the Civil War, criminal law was often a very 
public business.  At least in locally prominent cases, a criminal trial was not 
something to be read about in the paper, but witnessed in person.  It was not a 
sealed-off world of legal professionals.  It was news, entertainment, spectacle. 
Second, it is worth noting, even in this setting of mob violence, how 
important a role a certain subset of the lawyer‘s arts assumed.  Lawyers in old 
Missouri were public characters.  Their forensic skills, their physical 
presence, their powers of verbal persuasion, were not only their professional 
stock in trade, but were the foundations of their reputations and careers.
59
  
Notice that, although Rollins failed to save his client in the end, his speech to 
the mob convinced them to return their victim, at least for awhile.  And 
Guitar, too, managed to persuade the mob at least to clothe their violence with 
orderly procedure.  These were oral advocates par excellence, as well as men 
of not inconsiderable physical and moral courage.  Of course, they were also 
men of their time.  Neither was going to lay down his life for the due process 
rights of a slave accused of rape.  And Guitar‘s plea for, in effect, an orderly 
lynching may be thought pretty small beer from the elected prosecutor of the 
county.  But they were willing to stand against the hysterical bigotry of their 
fellows, at least to a point.  As their subsequent careers show, the people of 
central Missouri valued advocacy of this sort (even if on this particular grim 
occasion, one bloodthirsty faction was determined not to be cheated of its 
hanging).  Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate, for a very long time, oral 
advocacy was the dominant mode of legal persuasion even in the appellate 
courts of nineteenth-century Missouri. 
II.  CRIMINAL APPEALS IN ANTEBELLUM MISSOURI 
A.  The Dearth of Criminal Appeals in Old Missouri 
To the modern lawyer, one of the most striking things about mid-
nineteenth-century Missouri criminal practice is that the absence of an appeal 
 
58. Id. at 374. 
59. Rollins, in particular, was widely known as an orator and perhaps as a man with his eye 
firmly on the main chance.  One nineteenth-century chronicler characterized him as an 
―accomplished scholar and orator,‖ and then related the remarks of one of Rollins‘ early teachers, 
Judge John F. Ryland, who said that the first letter Rollins learned ―was the letter I, and it would be 
the last he would forget.‖  WILLIAM VAN NESS BAY, REMINISCENCES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF 
MISSOURI 272 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1878).  
2009] APPEALS IN CIVIL WAR ERA MISSOURI 357 
was not a phenomenon peculiar to trials interrupted by lynchings.  To the 
contrary, hardly any criminal defendants sought appellate review of their 
convictions.  Understanding why requires an inquiry into the legal culture, 
institutions, and rules of the time. 
Missouri became a state in 1821, and by 1860 was the eighth-most 
populous with 1.2 million people.
60
  But before the Civil War, Missouri had 
one appellate court, the state supreme court, which consisted of three judges, 
one clerk, and perhaps a couple other employees.
61
  It sat in various cities,
62
 
and had both appellate jurisdiction over every class of civil and criminal case 
and ―general superintending control over all inferior courts.‖63  It was 
therefore a very busy tribunal.  But for a long time it did very little criminal 
business.  In 1822, its first year of operation, the Missouri Supreme Court 
decided only three criminal cases,
64
 no criminal cases at all in 1823, one in 
1824,
65
 five in 1825,
66
 none in 1826, and two in 1827.
67
  In its first ten years 
of operation, the court decided only twenty-five criminal matters.
68
  Four or 
five criminal cases a year remained the norm until the late 1830s,
69
 with the 
annual average rising to just shy of eleven by the 1840s.
70
  By 1859, Missouri 
 
60. Population of the United States (1860), http://www.civilwarhome.com/population1860.htm 
(last visited June 9, 2010); see also 3 PARRISH, supra note 30, at 7 (placing Missouri‘s 1860 
population at 1,182,012). 
61. Laurance M. Hyde, Historical Review of the Judicial System of Missouri (pt. 2), 5 MO. 
SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 3, 3 (1993). 
62. Originally, the Missouri General Assembly was authorized to establish judicial districts, not 
to exceed four, in each of which the supreme court was required to hold two sessions annually.  Id.  
Thereafter, the legislature periodically changed the required locations for convening the court.  
Beginning in 1843, the court convened at least one of its annual sessions in the state capital, Jefferson 
City.  Joseph S. Summers, Jr., A Home for the Supreme Court, 1 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 8, 8 
(1987). 
63. Hyde, supra note 61, at 3. 
64. State v. Newell, 1 Mo. 177 (1822); Calloway v. State, 1 Mo. 150 (1822); State v. Bray, 
1 Mo. 126 (1822). 
65. Journey v. State, 1 Mo. 304 (1824). 
66. State v. Bird, 1 Mo. 416 (1825); State v. Cook, 1 Mo. 390 (1825); State v. Logan, 1 Mo. 
377 (1825); State v. Douglass, 1 Mo. 374 (1825); State v. Ames, 1 Mo. 372 (1825). 
67. Lowry v. State, 1 Mo. 518 (1827); King v. State, 1 Mo. 514 (1827).  A third case, Strother 
v. State, 1 Mo. 554 (1827), involves a fine against an attorney for contempt of court, but this appears 
to be a civil contempt. 
68. See generally the first three volumes of the Missouri Reports at 1–3 Mo. 
69. In 1835, the Missouri Supreme Court decided only one criminal case, State v. Epperson, 
4 Mo. 90 (1835), but by 1839, the court‘s criminal caseload was up to ten: Laporte v. State, 6 Mo. 
208 (1839); Page v. State, 6 Mo. 205 (1839); State v. Mitchell, 6 Mo. 147 (1839); Fanny v. State, 6 
Mo. 122 (1839); State v. Acuff, 6 Mo. 54 (1839); Nicholas v. State, 6 Mo. 6 (1839); Garret v. State, 6 
Mo. 1 (1839); Hilderbrand v. State, 5 Mo. 548 (1839); Porter v. State, 5 Mo. 538 (1839); and Frasier 
v. State, 5 Mo. 536 (1839). 
70. In 1845, only five criminal cases were decided by the Missouri Supreme Court, see 9 Mo., 
while 1847 saw a decade-high of nineteen, see 10–11 Mo. 
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had over one million people living in 114 counties
71
 and eighteen judicial 
districts,
72
 but only seventeen criminal appeals, or fewer than one per judicial 
district, were decided by its supreme court.
73
  Not only was the absolute 
number of criminal cases low, but criminal matters constituted a tiny fraction 
of the overall supreme court docket throughout the prewar period.  For 
example, in 1859, the court issued written opinions in 213 cases,
74
 but the 
seventeen criminal appeals decided that year made up only 8% of the total. 
Figuring out why this was so requires an understanding of contemporary 
criminal procedure, and the economic realities and professional norms of 
lawyers, trial courts, and the Missouri Supreme Court.  Start with criminal 
procedure.  From its inception in 1822, the Supreme Court of Missouri had 
jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments in all criminal cases brought by 
―writ of error.‖75  At common law, a writ of error in criminal cases was a plea 
for appellate relief based on, as Blackstone put it, ―notorious mistakes in the 
judgment or other part of the record.‖76  The examples Blackstone gives of 
such mistakes—entering judgment of a felony for conviction of a crime that 
was only a misdemeanor, ―not properly naming the sheriff or other officer of 
the court, or not duly describing where his county court was held‖77—make it 
clear that in his day criminal writs of error were designed primarily to correct 
technical legal mistakes in pleadings or the entry of judgments, and were not a 
vehicle for examining trial errors of the sort that now form the basis for most 
criminal appeals.  In early nineteenth-century Missouri, appeal by writ of 
error probably had a broader potential scope than in Blackstone‘s England, 
but it was still aimed at opening to appellate scrutiny only errors manifest on 
the face of the record, such as whether a prosecution under a given statute 
must be initiated by indictment
78
 or might be brought by information,
79
 the 
proper form of indictments,
80
 challenges to the jurisdiction of particular courts 
 
71. See List of Counties in Missouri, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_counties_ 
in_Missouri (last visited June 9, 2010). 
72. See 1859 Mo. Laws 27 (―An Act to establish the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit . . . .‖). 
73. See 27–29 Mo. 
74. By contrast, in 2008, the seven judges of the Missouri Supreme Court with all their law 
clerks, support staff, and computer technology, issued only 100 opinions. 
75. Calloway v. State, 1 Mo. 150 (1822); State v. Foster, 2 Mo. 170 (1830) (noting that the 
then-applicable statute made issuance of writs of error ―‗a matter of right‘‖). 
76. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *391. 
77. Id. 
78. State v. Stein, 2 Mo. 56 (1828) (holding that, as a federal constitutional matter, charges of 
assault and battery must be brought by indictment).  
79. Journey v. State, 1 Mo. 304 (1824). 
80. All three criminal appeals decided in 1825 were of this type.  State v. Cook, 1 Mo. 390 
(1825) (quashing an indictment because the allegation regarding the place where the offense was 
committed was written into the margin); State v. Logan, 1 Mo. 377 (1825) (upholding an indictment 
for stealing a book against the challenge that it failed to state the title of the book); State v. Ames, 
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over particular crimes
81
 or to the procedure employed to summon a jury,
82
 and 
some constitutional questions such as double jeopardy.
83
  However, a 
moment‘s reflection reveals that errors of this kind represent only a small 
fraction of what we would now consider the potentially appealable errors in a 
criminal case. 
Most of the errors that go the heart of whether a defendant really received 
a procedurally correct and substantively fair trial are not discernible merely 
from examination of the indictment, the jury rolls, the judgment, and other 
formal pleadings.  Appeal on the merits presupposes a robust record of the 
evidence presented, the legal motions and objections made, the judge‘s 
instructions to the jury, and the rulings and reasons of the court below, 
accompanied by an enumeration of the supposed errors and the relief 
requested.  At common law, the enumeration of errors that initiated this kind 
of appeal was called a ―bill of exceptions.‖84  Bills of exceptions were 
prepared by counsel and then endorsed or approved by the trial judge before 
transmission to the appellate tribunal.  In antebellum Missouri, there was a 
series of obstacles to the more complete appellate review afforded by a bill of 
exceptions. 
First, although bills of exceptions were not unknown in early Missouri 
practice—the second criminal case ever decided by the Missouri Supreme 
Court entertained arguments brought by a bill of exceptions
85—in 1830, the 
court held that a bill of exceptions was only available in civil cases.
86
  It 
reiterated this view on several occasions,
87
 until the new procedural code 
 
1 Mo. 372, 373 (1825) (rejecting a challenge to an indictment for illegal gambling on the ground, 
inter alia, that it failed to identify the particular game of chance being played); see also Lilly v. State, 
3 Mo. 8 (1831); State v. Foster, 2 Mo. 170 (1830). 
81. State v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 292 (1834); Wilder v. State, 3 Mo. 291 (1834). 
82. Samuels v. State, 3 Mo. 50, 51 (1831). 
83. State v. Payne, 4 Mo. 376, 377 (1836) (considering whether a conviction by a justice of the 
peace lacking jurisdiction over an offense acts a double jeopardy bar to subsequent prosecution in a 
court with jurisdiction). 
84. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *372.  William G. Hammond, editor of an early 
American edition of the COMMENTARIES, described a bill of exceptions as ―embodying all the 
evidence and rulings thereon, or so much as is necessary to show the grounds of exception to an 
appellate court.‖  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 523 n.* 
(William G. Hammond ed., San Francisco, Bancroft–Whitney Co. 1890).  The Missouri Supreme 
Court explained that ―the writ of error removes merely the record proper [to the appellate court, 
whereas] the bill of exceptions is intended to place upon the record some matter that would not 
appear in the regular progress of the cause.‖  Mitchell v. State, 3 Mo. 201, 202 (1833); see also State 
v. Wall, 15 Mo. 208, 209 (1851) (holding that where an indictment is quashed for causes not 
appearing on its face, the action of the court and its reasons should be made part of the record by a 
bill of exceptions). 
85. Calloway v. State, 1 Mo. 150 (1822). 
86. State v. Henry, 2 Mo. 178, 178 (1830). 
87. Vaughn & Vaughn v. State, 4 Mo. 290, 293 (1836); Mitchell v. State, 3 Mo. 201, 202 
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enacted in 1835 explicitly guaranteed the right to such bills in criminal 
matters.
88
 
The 1835 code (which remained substantially unchanged during the 
prewar period)
89
 specified that all convicted criminal defendants had an 
absolute right of appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court,
90
 and that appeals on 
writs of error from such judgments were appeals as of right.
91
  The law 
legislatively overturned the supreme court‘s restrictions on bills of exceptions.  
It created a right to a bill of exceptions in criminal cases to the same extent 
allowed in civil ones.
92
  It also imposed a duty on the clerk of the circuit court 
from which an appeal was taken ―to make out a full transcript of the record in 
the cause, including the bill of exceptions, judgment and sentence, and certify 
and return the same to the office of the clerk of the supreme court.‖93 
The effect of the 1835 law was immediately evident in the supreme 
court‘s published reports.  Beginning in 1836, the reports began to include 
much more factual detail about evidence and pre- and post-trial proceedings—
detail that can only have come from the evidentiary summaries and other 
components of the record that were necessary to filing a bill of exceptions.
94
  
 
(1833). 
88. Vaughn & Vaughn, 4 Mo. at 294–95 (―As the law now stands under the revised statutes of 
the last session of the legislature, the plaintiffs would be entitled to their bill of exceptions, but this 
case originated under the old law.‖). 
89. Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. (1835) with Mo. Rev. Stat. (1856).   The 1835 procedural code 
survived largely unchanged well into the 1870s.  See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 2986 n.(a) (1879) 
(referring to ―the statute of 1835, of which the present statute is almost an exact copy‖).  
90. ―In all cases of final judgment rendered upon any indictment, an appeal to the supreme 
court shall be allowed, if applied for during the term at which such judgment is rendered.‖  Practice 
and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 1, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498 (1835) (emphasis supplied).  It 
appears that this jurisdiction extended to both felony and misdemeanor convictions.  Although the 
statute refers to judgments ―upon any indictment,‖ suggesting to the modern reader that this 
provision would apply only to felonies, it appears that under contemporary practice, both 
misdemeanor and felony prosecutions were initiated by indictment.  See Practice and Proceedings in 
Criminal Cases, art. III, § 22, Mo. Rev. Stat 481 (1835), which prescribes the procedures for 
indictments in a ―trespass against the person or property of another, not amounting to felony.‖  Even 
before 1835, it appears that some misdemeanors were indictable offenses.  See Journey v. State, 
1 Mo. 304, 304 (1824) (finding the crime of ―retailing spirituous liquors, without [a] license,‖ 
punishable by a fine of $100, might be ―an indictable offence‖ if that mode of procedure were 
prescribed by the legislature, but that in this case the law prescribed an information). 
91. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 2, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498 (1835). 
92. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VI, § 23, Mo. Rev. Stat. 491 (1835); see 
also Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, ch. 127, art. VI, § 27, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1193–94 
(1856) (reiterating the language first adopted in 1835). 
93. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 9, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498–99 (1835). 
94. See Vaughn & Vaughn v. State, 4 Mo. 290, 291 (1836) (including the brief of Shannon, 
Hunt, and Porter, the defendants‘ attorneys, which noted, ―The record proper, we have brought here 
by writ of error, and the bill of exceptions we now have here sworn to, and ask that the same may be 
filed as a part of the record‖); Polk v. State, 4 Mo. 544 (1837) (beginning with the parties‘ briefs, and 
concluding with the opinion of the court, which describes and rules on the contents of the bill of 
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It became common practice for the court to publish the ―briefs‖ of the parties 
as an introduction to the opinion of the court.
95
  And although technical 
pleading issues remained common,
96
 the range of questions considered by the 
court notably broadened to include more challenges based on the sufficiency 
of the evidence
97
 and matters such as the competency, credibility, and 
impeachment of witnesses
98
 or the correctness of jury instructions given the 
facts of a case.
99
  Nonetheless, despite the increased latitude of issues 
cognizable on appeal after 1835, the number of appeals remained small.  What 
else might have been at work? 
One part of the answer may have been that filing an appeal did not stay 
the execution of the criminal judgment and sentence unless either the trial 
court or the supreme court certified that there was ―probable cause for such 
appeal . . . or so much doubt as to render it expedient to take the judgment of 
the supreme court thereon,‖100 although a trial judge refusing certification was 
obliged to enter a temporary stay of ―sufficient time to make application to the 
supreme court‖ for a certification.101  Absent certification from either the trial 
court or the supreme court, the circuit court clerk would prepare the record, 
with its bill of exceptions, and the appeal could proceed,
102
 but the judgment 
would be entered and the sentence—whether the imposition of a fine, 
confinement to prison, or execution—would go forward.  This procedural 
obstacle to full review of a defendant‘s appellate arguments shortened the life 
of John Chapman in 1858. 
B.  State v. John Chapman—An Appeal Stillborn 
On Friday, June 29, 1855, somebody shot and killed John C. Denham 
from ambush while he was plowing his fields in northeastern Boone 
County.
103
  Suspicion immediately fell on John Chapman, one of Denham‘s 
neighbors, but before Chapman could be detained, he fled to Ohio.  Roughly a 
year later, Chapman imprudently returned, and was discovered and arrested.
104
  
He was represented by four lawyers—James Rollins and Odon Guitar of 
 
exceptions). 
95. See, e.g., id.; State v. Heatherly, 4 Mo. 478 (1837) (beginning with the brief of Wood, 
counsel for the defendant, and concluding with the opinion of the court). 
96. See, e.g., Porter v. State, 5 Mo. 538, 540 (1839) (concluding that a challenged change of 
venue was proper). 
97. See, e.g., Frasier v. State, 5 Mo. 536, 536 (1839). 
98. See, e.g., Garret v. State, 6 Mo. 1, 1 (1839). 
99. See, e.g., Nicholas v. State, 6 Mo. 6, 6 (1839). 
100. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 3, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498–99 (1835). 
101. Id. § 4. 
102. Id. §§ 10–11. 
103. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 385. 
104. Id. 
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Columbia, Jerre P. Lancaster of Ralls, and Andrew Herndon of Howard 
County
105—a sort of old Missouri dream team.106  They were opposed by 
John F. Williams, then the circuit attorney of the second judicial circuit 
(which encompassed both Boone and Howard Counties) and later one of 
Guitar‘s military subordinates,107 and Robert T. Prewitt, formerly the second 
judicial circuit attorney.
108
  The defense lawyers engaged in all sorts of legal 
maneuvering, including securing a change of venue to Fayette in Howard 
County, and conducted the defense with, as an admiring contemporary 
described it, ―a zeal and eloquence unsurpassed in criminal trials in the 
West.‖109  Rollins was so good that one young lawyer watching the trial 
remembered his closing argument forty years later.
110
  Nonetheless, Chapman 
was convicted on June 11, 1858, and sentenced to hang.
111
  On June 14, 1858, 
Rollins wrote to his son back East:
112
 
 
105. Id. at 386.  Herndon seems to have been a solid, but unspectacular, longtime Howard 
County practitioner taken on as local counsel, perhaps to provide knowledge of the local judiciary 
and jury venire to the out-of-towners from Columbia.  See BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, 
supra note 46, at 244 (characterizing Herndon as ―one of the oldest and most respected lawyers of 
Howard county‖).  I can find no information about Lancaster, other than his association with this 
case. 
106. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 386. 
107. Id. at 385–86; see also GENTRY, supra note 1, at 54, 64.  Williams had received his legal 
training from Prewitt.  BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 228.  During the 
Civil War, he sided with the Union and served with, and under, Odon Guitar in the Ninth Cavalry of 
the Missouri State Militia.  See SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877 (noting that Guitar raised the Ninth 
Cavalry and commanded it until his promotion in 1863 to brigadier general); BENCH AND BAR OF 
MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 228 (noting that Williams helped raise the Ninth Cavalry and 
became its colonel in 1863).  Williams emerged from the war as a colonel and went on to become 
speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives and superintendent of Missouri‘s insurance 
department.  Id. at 228–29. 
108. Prewitt was second judicial circuit attorney from 1852 to 1856, although one source gives 
the dates of Prewitt‘s service as 1853 to 1857.  BAY, supra note 59, at 533; see also GENTRY, supra 
note 1, at 54.  He was reputed to be ―a fluent and impressive speaker, but not an orator.  His style of 
declamation was more conversational than otherwise.‖  BAY, supra note 59, at 535.  Another source 
called him ―one of the ablest lawyers in that part of the State.‖  Henry, supra note 37, at 389. 
109. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 385–86. 
110. Writing in 1898, Thomas Shackelford said, ―Major Rollins‘ appeal to the jury surpassed, 
in my youthful opinion, anything I ever heard.  His impassioned address still lingers in my memory.‖  
Thomas Shackelford, Reminiscences of the Bench and Bar in Central Missouri, in BENCH AND BAR 
OF MISSOURI, supra note 37, at 398.  
111. The article Chapman Convicted, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, June 25, 1858, at 4, reported 
that Chapman ―was convicted of murder in the first degree on Friday evening last,‖ which would 
appear to put the conviction on June 18, 1858; however, the article was apparently reprinted from the 
Fayette newspaper, and we know from a letter by James Rollins that Chapman was convicted prior to 
June 14, 1858.  Letter of James S. Rollins to James H. Rollins (June 14, 1858), Western Historical 
Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Collection No. C1026, file 191 [hereinafter Rollins 
Letter (6/14/1858)]. 
112. Rollins‘ eldest son was attending the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, from which he 
later graduated.  BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 242. 
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I returned home last evening from the Howard court, where I 
went to defend a man charged with murder.  I made a great 
speech for him, but to no purpose as the jury found him guilty 
and he will be hung next Friday 4 weeks [i.e., four weeks 
from next Friday].  Guitar also made for him a splendid 
speech besides one or two other gentlemen.
113
 
Two points in these remarks leap out at the modern reader.  The first is the 
emphasis Rollins placed on the ―speeches,‖ what we would call closing 
arguments, rather than on the evidence.  Contemporary newspaper accounts of 
the trial provide one hint about why the speeches assumed such a prominent 
place in Rollins‘ mind.  After prosecutor Prewitt gave a two-hour opening 
summation, all four defense lawyers addressed the jury: Lancaster for two 
hours, Herndon for three, followed by Rollins, and then by Guitar, whereupon 
Circuit Attorney Williams rose in rebuttal.
114
  Although the lengths of the 
orations by Rollins, Guitar, and Williams are not recorded, closing arguments 
in the case must have run no less than ten to twelve hours.  All the surviving 
mentions of the case in the public press describe the oratory,
115
 but none says 
a word about the facts or legal issues that make up the merits of a case. 
The second notable feature of Rollins‘ letter to his son is the obvious air 
of resignation to the inevitability of a prompt execution.  The letter exudes the 
sense that, having given a ―great speech,‖ a defense attorney‘s job was done.  
There is no hint that appellate review might even postpone the hanging.  Yet 
we know that the defense team publicly declared their intention to appeal.
116
  
And by June 14, the date of Rollins‘ letter, the defense had already filed the 
bill of exceptions with the Howard County Circuit Court, whose clerk noted 
that the appeal was ―approved.‖117  Nonetheless, as Rollins foretold, the 
sentence was carried out four weeks after the verdict, on Friday, July 16, 
1858.
118
 
 
113. Rollins Letter (6/14/1858), supra note 111. 
114. Chapman Convicted, supra note 111. 
115. According to the press, Prewitt spoke with ―great power and ingenuity.‖  Lancaster led off 
the defense ―in an eloquent and searching speech . . . which would have done honor to one of much 
longer experience in his profession.‖  Herndon‘s address ―was bold, eloquent, and logical.‖  Rollins 
―made one of his finest efforts.‖  Guitar‘s argument was ―an extraordinary one.‖  And Williams 
concluded with ―his greatest effort, and he showed himself able to meet the ablest lawyers in the 
State.‖  Id. 
116. The Fayette newspaper reported, ―We learn that the case will be taken up to the Supreme 
Court.‖  Chapman Convicted, supra note 111. 
117. State v. John Chapman (1858), microformed on Records of Circuit Court of Howard 
County, Missouri, Missouri State Archives, box 23, folder 77, unit 1, rows 5–8, microfilm roll 33860.  
According to the clerk, the defense also filed an ―affidavit for an appeal.‖  Id.  The function of this 
affidavit is not clear. 
118. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 386–87; Hung, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, July 23, 1858, at 3; 
Execution of John Chapman, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, July 30, 1858, at 3.  Perhaps Rollins‘ 
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What happened?  Why was Chapman‘s execution not at least postponed 
by the appellate process?  Surely a case that provided grist for ten to twelve 
hours of jury argument must have presented at least one substantial appellate 
issue.  Rollins and Guitar certainly seem to have thought so.  They rushed to 
file the trial record with the supreme court and in their pleadings enumerated 
six grounds for appeal.
119
  However, so far as can be determined from the 
Howard County records, while the trial judge ―approved‖ the appeal, he never 
issued a certification that there was probable cause for an appeal, thus 
effectively denying a stay and leaving the execution date undisturbed.  On 
July 8, 1858, Rollins and Guitar filed a motion for stay of execution of the 
judgment with the Missouri Supreme Court and asked that the case be set over 
to the following term of court.
120
  The court denied the motion without 
comment the following day
121
 and Chapman was hung a week later, protesting 
his innocence to the last.
122
 
The refusal of the Supreme Court to hear Chapman‘s appeal on the merits 
is startling, at least to the modern legal sensibility.  The case was locally 
notorious and Chapman‘s counsel were prominent men, Rollins having come 
within several hundred votes of being elected governor only months before.  
Moreover, as a review of the trial record makes clear, the evidence against 
Chapman, though sufficient to support the conviction, was entirely 
circumstantial and hardly unimpeachable.
123
  And denying this stay sent a man 
to the gallows. 
We do not know how common it was for trial judges to decline 
certification of cases for appeal or for the supreme court to refuse to grant a 
stay, but if certifications and stays were often denied, that practice would have 
discouraged pursuit of appellate relief.  Indeed, one suspects that the court‘s 
summary treatment of Chapman‘s widely publicized case would in itself have 
chilled the appellate ardor of Missouri criminal practitioners. 
 
fatalism was the product of experience.  Not only had his oratory failed to save Hiram from lynching, 
but as a young lawyer in 1836, he defended a slave named Conway on a murder charge and 
―delivered an argument of great eloquence and ability‖ that was remembered decades later ―for its 
remarkable power and beauty.‖  Conway was convicted nonetheless and hung four weeks later, 
despite lingering doubts about his guilt.  SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 206–07. 
119. Motion for Supersedeas, State v. John Chapman (1858), Supreme Court Case Files, 
Missouri State Archives, location 16A/6/3, box 227, folder 13. 
120. Motion for Stay of Judgment, id. 
121. Order Refusing an Application for Supersedeas, id. 
122. See supra note 118. 
123. According to the record filed with the Missouri Supreme Court, no one saw Chapman 
shoot the victim.  His conviction was based, inter alia, on testimony that Chapman had threatened the 
deceased and others before the murder, that Chapman was seen in the area carrying a rifle at about 
the time of the shooting, and some extraordinarily primitive forensic testimony.  Record on Appeal, 
Chapman, supra note 119. 
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C.  Other Impediments to Appeals 
Available evidence suggests that another significant impediment to filing 
appeals in old Missouri was the very process made possible by the 1835 code 
reform.  Filing an appeal on a bill of exceptions required getting someone to 
write out, in longhand, a record of the evidence adduced at trial and of all the 
objections and motions and the court‘s ruling on them (or at least all the 
objections, motions, and rulings the appellant thought pertinent), as well as 
making copies, in longhand, of the indictment, the jury instructions, the final 
judgment, and any other official documents that were part of the trial 
record.
124
  Not only were there no electronic means of recording testimony or 
copying documents, but in old Missouri, there was no cadre of court reporters 
routinely taking notes of everything that transpired in every case.  Each circuit 
court had a court clerk, who was charged by statute to ―seasonably record the 
judgments, rules, orders, and other proceedings of the court,‖125 but the clerk‘s 
charge did not include creating a verbatim transcription, or even 
contemporaneous notes, of testimony, legal objections, or arguments.  One 
supposes that at least some clerks assumed responsibility for taking good 
contemporaneous notes or delegated that task to a deputy clerk, but there was 
no legal requirement that they do so or even that they have any training that 
would suit them for the task.
126
  Accordingly, the creation of the record of 
witness testimony and trial proceedings necessary to create a bill of 
exceptions seems to have been a retrospective exercise of reconstructing what 
occurred once the trial was over, undertaken only if one of the advocates was 
contemplating appeal.  Moreover, it appears that, at least in many counties, it 
was the lawyer contemplating appeal himself who had to write up both the 
summary of the evidence, objections, and rulings and the bill of exceptions. 
Not until 1887 did the Missouri Legislature pass a law authorizing the 
appointment of shorthand reporters in circuit courts.  According to Judge 
North Todd Gentry of Boone County, 
Before 1887, the lawyer or lawyers who lost in the circuit 
court prepared the bill of exceptions; and usually did so one 
night during that term of court.  Old lawyers say that it often 
took them all night to write out the testimony; and that no one 
thought of taking until the next term in which to prepare the 
bill.  But the appointment of a stenographer almost 
 
124. And the job had to be done right for the supreme court to accept that errors were properly 
preserved.  See Nathan v. State, 8 Mo. 631, 632 (1844) (discussing deficiencies in the bill of 
exceptions).  
125. Clerks, ch. 26, § 21, Mo. Rev. Stat 338 (1856).  
126. In 1855, the sole legal prerequisites for appointment or election as clerk were that the 
candidate be free, white, twenty-one years old, a resident of the state for a year, and of the county in 
which he would serve for three months.  Id. § 10. 
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revolutionized the practice.  Prior to that, few lawyers 
practiced in the appellate courts and few cases were appealed.  
But after Miss Matthews
127
 learned to prepare bills of 
exceptions, appellate practice was simplified and Boone 
county lawyers soon became familiar with proceedings in the 
higher courts.
128
 
If the difficulty and inconvenience of writing up testimony and bills of 
exceptions acted as a barrier to appellate review even for lawyers practicing in 
and around a relatively populous county seat like Columbia, the impediment 
would have been greater still for the not inconsiderable portion of the bar that 
rode circuit.  Judge Charles B. McAfee, writing in 1897, recalled that in 
southwest Missouri both before and for some years after the Civil War, ―a 
lawyer‘s practice was largely away from home, and often embraced several 
judicial circuits.  The circumstances of those days generally involved an 
absence from home of from two to eight weeks and the attorney was in court 
almost every day that he was not on the road.‖129  A lawyer riding circuit 
lacked both the time and convenient facilities for writing up bills of 
exceptions in any but the most extraordinary case.  Even if a circuit-riding 
lawyer took the trouble to arrange preparation of the record and a bill of 
exceptions, just ensuring that these documents reached the supreme court 
presented some difficulty.  For example, Columbia is only thirty miles from 
the state capital of Jefferson City, where the supreme court was headquartered 
from its inception, but regular mail service between the two cities was not 
instituted until 1856.
130
 
Another, seemingly circular, reason for the dearth of criminal appeals was 
the dearth of existing appellate law.  Between 1822 and 1860, the Missouri 
Supreme Court wrote perhaps 550 criminal opinions.  This sounds like a 
goodly number, but, examined carefully, these cases contained strikingly little 
help for the would-be criminal appellant.  First, they addressed a very narrow 
range of potential issues.  As we have seen, for a long time, the court focused 
primarily on the technical questions appealable on a writ of error.  More 
widespread use of bills of exceptions beginning in the late 1830s slowly 
broadened the court‘s decisional coverage, but the importance of the advent of 
shorthand reporters in 1887—and of their absence before—can hardly be 
exaggerated.  We assume as a matter of course that a neutral official will 
automatically create and preserve a ―record‖ of the precise wording and 
 
127. Laura Matthews was Boone County‘s first official court stenographer.  She was appointed 
in 1887 and served until 1904.  GENTRY, supra note 1, at 63. 
128. Id. at 63–64. 
129. Charles B. McAfee, Riding the Circuits in Southwest Missouri, in BENCH AND BAR OF 
MISSOURI, supra note 37, at 72, reprinted in 6 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 6, 6 (1998). 
130. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 383. 
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sequence of questions, answers, objections, arguments, remarks from the 
bench, and rulings in any trial.  Such a record is the raw material of the 
appellate lawyer‘s trade to be mined in retrospective leisure for evidence of 
error.  But prior to 1887, even if a lawyer or clerk had the foresight to take 
good notes during a trial or a nearly photographic memory upon which to rely 
afterward, the trial record was, at best, a summary containing only the basic 
thrust and major points of testimony, together with descriptions of the 
objections and legal rulings the lawyer taking the appeal thought critical at the 
time the record was being prepared.
131
  And of course, the federal criminal 
procedure revolution with its exclusionary rule was more than a century in the 
future so, with only rare exceptions,
132
 the conduct of citizens or law 
enforcement officials in securing evidence was not a live appellate question.  
In short, the number of criminal questions the Missouri Supreme Court had 
ever decided stayed small for decades. 
Second, even on the questions it addressed, the court‘s opinions were very 
short.  Prior to the 1835 statute authorizing bills of exceptions, most cases 
were resolved in a page or perhaps two.  The opinions were not only terse, but 
they often did nothing more than announce the court‘s resolution of the case, 
with little added in the way of explanation or even citation of authority.
133
  
After bills of exceptions became de rigueur, the number of pages devoted to 
each case in the Missouri Reports increased somewhat, but much of the initial 
increase consisted of reprinting all or portions of the summaries of testimony 
or the parties‘ briefs134 as introductions to the opinions of the court, which 
themselves tended to remain short.
135
  By the mid-1850s, the practice of 
printing testimonial summaries in full seems to have fallen out of favor, 
although the parties‘ briefs were still sometimes reproduced.136  But the judges 
remained curt.  Of the seventeen criminal cases decided in 1859, thirteen 
consume less than three printed pages in the Missouri Reports, everything 
included.  The overwhelming impression produced by reading its opinions is 
that, with occasional exceptions, the early antebellum court conceived of its 
 
131. See, e.g., McMillen v. State, 13 Mo. 30, 32 (1850) (―All the testimony given on the trial is 
not preserved in the bill of exceptions, but enough is stated to show the important facts in the case.‖). 
132. For an exception, see Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 135, 136 (1829) (excluding a slave‘s 
confession to burglary on the ground that it was obtained through flogging). 
133. See, e.g., id.  The court reversed Hector‘s conviction without reference to any authority 
whatsoever. 
134. See, e.g., Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502, 503–04 (1851) (beginning with the arguments of 
Mr. Blennerhassett, attorney for the appellant, and Mr. Lackland, counsel for the state).  
135. See, e.g., Fanny v. State, 6 Mo. 122 (1839) (containing an eighteen-page summary of 
evidence and testimony, one-half page constituting the appellant‘s entire brief, and a two-page 
judicial opinion). 
136. See, e.g., State v. Woodward, 21 Mo. 265, 265 (1855) (prefacing the opinion of Judge 
Ryland with the brief of Cline and Jamison for the respondent). 
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job primarily as resolving the particular disputes before it, rather than as 
creating a body of reasoned precedent for the guidance of the trial bench and 
bar.  This impression is reinforced if one goes into the state archives and 
examines the original appellate files (which happily still exist).  Even in cases 
where the lawyers and scriveners who created the record took some pains to 
write clearly, well, and at length, the court‘s opinion is sometimes a nearly 
illegible scrawl on a half-sheet of paper. 
Not only was the Missouri Supreme Court creating relatively little law in 
the criminal field, but the trial bench and bar had difficulty accessing it.  
Publication of the court‘s opinions was slow, sometimes involving years of 
lag time,
137
 and there was no system of advance sheets.  Even when collected 
in the Missouri Reports, the court‘s opinions obviously could not be searched 
electronically and there was, as yet, no equivalent of the West key number 
system or the Shepard‘s citator system, which had its beginnings in Chicago 
in the 1870s.
138
  The relative paucity of published opinions probably made 
keeping up with new developments in a single field relatively easy, if one had 
ready access to the Reports.  But few, if any, lawyers could afford to be 
specialists.  And by 1858, when Rollins and Guitar were crafting an appeal for 
Chapman, the Missouri Reports had filled their twenty-seventh volume.
139
  
Well-to-do town-based practitioners like Rollins and Guitar would certainly 
have had their own sets of the Reports ready at hand, but circuit-riding 
lawyers and judges could hardly throw twenty-seven volumes in a 
saddlebag.
140
 
The want of written legal authority extended beyond the small number, 
narrow scope, and relative inaccessibility of the Missouri Supreme Court‘s 
published opinions.  Even persuasive authority was at a premium.  Most 
lawyers owned a copy of Blackstone and a few other basic books,
141
 but law 
 
137. For example, the second volume of supreme court reports was compiled and published by 
a private attorney, Louis Houck, and collected opinions issued from 1827 to 1830.  The third volume, 
also compiled by Houck, included one 1829 opinion left out of the earlier volume, Tracy & 
Wahrendorff v. State, 3 Mo. 3 (1829), followed by cases from 1831 to 1835.  2–3 Mo. (Houck).  A 
Missouri lawyer practicing in 1835 would have had a long wait for an authoritative volume 
containing cases decided four or five years before.  By the early 1840s, the lag between issuance of 
an opinion and its publication in the Reports was still as much as three years.  See, e.g., 7 Mo. 
(containing cases from 1840 to 1842 and published in 1843).  By the 1850s, the lag was down to 
about a year.  See, e.g., 16 Mo. (containing 1852 opinions and published in 1853).  
138. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 183 (1990). 
139. See, e.g., State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332 (1858). 
140. See McAfee, supra note 129, at 10 (recounting an argument before a justice of the peace, 
who after hours of disputation, exclaimed, ―‗You attorneys differ so widely about the law and we 
have not the books that each of you claim settles the case.  So how am I to decide it?  If we had the 
books, there would be no trouble, as each of you claim, but what am I to do without these books?‘‖).  
141. Id. at 7 (noting that Blackstone, Greenleaf (a treatise on evidence), and Chitty (a treatise 
on criminal law and procedure) were common sources). 
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libraries were rare and sparsely filled.  Treatises, statutes, and reported cases 
from England and other states were sometimes cited by lawyers
142
 or the court 
itself.
143
  But even the court seems to have been surprisingly ill-supplied, at 
least in its early days, as it was obliged to confess in one 1831 opinion where 
it wrote: ―To prove this, [plaintiff‘s counsel] cites 18 Johnson’s R., 212, and 
the authorities there cited.  We have not got the book before us, but if we 
recollect correctly, the decision is, that a venire is necessary in N[ew] Y[ork]; 
though they say they cannot see much use in it at this day.‖144 
Law begets law.  The more law you have, the easier it is to invoke.  The 
more law is invoked, the more courts and legislatures expand its compass and 
fill in its gaps and the easier it becomes to invoke again.  For antebellum 
Missouri lawyers, the job of pursuing new appeals was made more difficult in 
inverse relation to the small quantity of readily accessible existing law upon 
which appellate arguments might plausibly be based. 
Finally, the small number of criminal appeals in prewar Missouri must 
surely have had some relation to economics.  There was no system of 
appointed counsel for the indigent at trial, and certainly no provision for free 
appellate counsel.  Then as now, criminal defendants as a class were less 
likely to be able to afford lawyers.  And even the court costs associated with 
an appeal could be significant.  The case file of the 1857 case of State v. 
McClure
145
 preserved in the Missouri State Archives contains a long, itemized 
bill of costs exceeding $600, which would have been many thousands in 
today‘s dollars.  If, as appears to have been the case, these costs were taxed to 
defendants, the burden could be crippling.
146
 
We cannot know how many cases were not appealed for lack of funds, but 
the prevalence of two types of criminal cases among those that did get to the 
supreme court suggests the centrality of cash to the appellate calculus.  First, 
throughout the antebellum period, a strikingly high percentage of all criminal 
appeals were essentially regulatory in character, usually criminal ―dram shop‖ 
 
142. Perhaps unsurprisingly, lawyers from the big city of St. Louis seem to have been better 
armed with outstate authority.  See, e.g., State v. Woodward, 21 Mo. 265, 265–66 (1855) (including 
counsel‘s brief citing cases from England, Alabama, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Mississippi, and 
Iowa). 
143. See, e.g., Hemmaker v. State, 12 Mo. 453, 455 (1849) (citing one English treatise and 
cases from Massachusetts, Tennessee, North Carolina, and New York); Whitney v. State, 8 Mo. 165, 
168 (1843) (citing cases from New York and Virginia); Mitchell v. State, 3 Mo. 201, 202 (1833) 
(citing an English statute). 
144. Samuels v. State, 3 Mo. 50, 51 (1831) (second emphasis supplied). 
145. 25 Mo. 338 (1857). 
146. See Fees, ch. 64, § 11, Mo. Rev. Stat. 449–50 (1856) (enumerating the fees chargeable by 
clerks of courts having criminal jurisdiction); id. § 12 (specifying that ―[n]o fee shall be charged by 
any clerk, in any criminal case against the State or county, unless it is expressly allowed in the 
foregoing section‖). 
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cases involving the sale of liquor in violation of state or local ordinance.  For 
example, of the roughly twenty-five criminal cases decided by the Missouri 
Supreme Court in its first two decades, nine were liquor violations.
147
  In 
1859, five of the court‘s seventeen criminal decisions, or nearly a third, were 
dram shop cases.
148
  The appellants in these cases were business owners with 
both the money and the motivation to resist application of liquor laws to their 
premises.
149
 
The second proof of the importance of money to criminal appeals is the 
relative frequency of appeals on behalf of criminally convicted slaves, at least 
ten of which made their way to the supreme court between 1822 and 1860.
150
  
These cases highlight the paradoxes of slave society in many ways, not least 
among them the oddity of a legal system that insisted black people were 
property not essentially different from cattle or sheep, but which afforded 
them relatively complete due process rights before convicting and punishing 
them for crimes.  But for present purposes the key point about these cases is 
that their black defendants received the benefit of representation before the 
supreme court that poor whites of the period could not afford because slaves 
were valuable property.  They belonged in law to relatively affluent whites 
with the resources and incentive to ensure that their property was not damaged 
or destroyed by hanging, castration, imprisonment, or flogging.  Recall that, 
before the matter was ripped from the hands of the law, Hiram‘s owner 
retained for his defense James Rollins, one of the best lawyers and most 
prominent men in central Missouri. 
The dearth of law affected not only the choice of whether to appeal, but 
the way cases were conducted before the supreme court.  Characterizing 
today‘s massive appellate pleadings as ―briefs‖ always carries with it a certain 
mordant humor.  But in old Missouri, briefs were brief.  They usually 
consisted of short declarative statements, the closest analogue to which in 
modern practice would be the ―Issues Presented for Review‖ section of a U.S. 
Supreme Court brief, plus lists of whatever authorities the lawyer thought 
 
147. Casey v. State, 6 Mo. 646 (1840); State v. Spear, 6 Mo. 644 (1840); Frasier v. State, 6 Mo. 
195 (1839); Frasier v. State, 5 Mo. 536 (1839); State v. Hunter, 5 Mo.  360 (1838); State v. Corwin, 
4 Mo. 609 (1837); Storrs v. State, 3 Mo. 7 (1831); State v. English, 2 Mo. 147 (1829); Journey v. 
State, 1 Mo. 304 (1824).  
148. State v. Wells, 28 Mo. 565 (1859); State v. Mitchell, 28 Mo. 562 (1859); State v. 
Andrews, 28 Mo. 19 (1859); State v. Andrews, 28 Mo. 17 (1859); State v. Andrews, 28 Mo. 14 
(1859).   
149. A typical case is Wells, 28 Mo. at 566, in which the holder of a license to sell drugs and 
medicines is resisting the application of laws governing the retail sale of alcohol to his store. 
150. State v. Gilbert, 24 Mo. 380 (1857); State v. Joe, 19 Mo. 223 (1853); Nathan v. State, 
8 Mo. 631 (1844); Lucy v. State, 8 Mo. 134 (1843); Fanny v. State, 6 Mo. 122 (1839); Mary v. State, 
5 Mo. 71 (1837); Jim v. State, 3 Mo. 108 (1832); Jane v. State, 3 Mo. 45 (1831); State v. Henry, 
2 Mo. 178 (1830); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 135 (1829). 
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relevant.
151
  The evident purpose of these documents was to alert the court to 
the subjects that would be addressed in oral argument, which was the real 
heart of the proceeding.  Missouri Supreme Court practice provided for more 
than two hours of argument for each case.
152
  In old Missouri, even appellate 
work was primarily an exercise in oral advocacy. 
Which brings us back to John Chapman, facing his mortal end in four 
weeks despite the thunderous declamations and heart-wrenching perorations 
of his Dream Team.  Someone had enough money to retain not one, but four, 
lawyers for Chapman‘s defense.  And even if the money was exhausted after 
the trial, the impending execution loomed to inspire further exertions on the 
condemned client‘s behalf.  Between them, these lawyers had the money, 
time, facilities, and incentive to prepare a writ of error and bill of exceptions.  
In Columbia, they had access to the books, and though perhaps not appellate 
specialists, they were not complete novices.  Prior to 1858, Guitar or his firm 
had appeared before the supreme court twice and his defense colleague, 
Andrew Herndon, once,
153
 albeit in civil cases.
154
  They were plainly prepared 
to ride the thirty miles from Columbia to the state capital in Jefferson City to 
argue the case. 
The fact that not even these lawyers could get a full hearing on the merits 
from the Missouri Supreme Court in a capital case surprises us, but it was, I 
think, consistent with the legal spirit of the times.  Criminal lawyers in old 
Missouri would happily split hairs over the wording of an indictment or the 
jurisdiction of the trial court, but the pervasive hyperproceduralism that, 
depending on your point of view, either protects or infects modern law did not 
exist.  To Rollins and Guitar and their brethren practicing before the war, the 
idea of a fair trial implied one good, thorough airing of the facts before a local 
judge and jury, with ample opportunity for the lawyers to exercise their 
rhetorical gifts.  If the indictment charged the right crime, no egregious 
evidentiary errors of inclusion or exclusion occurred, and the jury received 
reasonably correct instructions on the law, that was satisfactory.  The notion 
of procedurally perfect justice with multiple layers of fine-grained review 
would, I think, have seemed an extravagance to them, at least in any case 
 
151. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 18 Mo. 419, 422 (1853) (including the brief of P.R. Hayden for 
the appellant consisting of five numbered declarative statements and one citation of authority); State 
v. Leapfoot, 19 Mo. 375, 375–76 (1854) (including briefs of both the attorney general and defense 
counsel, the attorney general‘s brief consisting of four sentences and citation of four cases, and 
defense counsel‘s brief consisting of three sentences and two citations of authority).  
152. See, e.g., G.A. FINKELNBURG & TYRRELL WILLIAMS, PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSOURI IN APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS AND ORIGINAL WRITS 258 
(2d ed. 1906) (noting that, as late as 1906, the practice was ―to allow an hour and a half to each side, 
without permitting any separate preliminary statement of the case as was formerly the custom‖).  
153. Thompson v. Botts, 8 Mo. 710 (1844). 
154. Pearson v. Inlow, 20 Mo. 322 (1855); Northcutt v. Northcutt, 20 Mo. 266 (1855). 
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where the stake was much less than life itself.  And even in such a case, the 
executioner‘s hand would not be stayed for any but the most palpable legal 
error. 
III.  AUTRES TEMPS, AUTRES MOEURS:  
CRIMINAL APPEALS DURING AND AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
In 1861, the low-grade irregular conflict between pro- and anti-slavery 
forces that had plagued the Kansas–Missouri border throughout the 1850s 
exploded into national civil war.  From the parochial perspective of the 
criminal appellate lawyer, however, the war changed less than might have 
been expected, despite some dramatic changes in personnel at the supreme 
court.  In 1861, once pro-Union forces took control of the state, evicted its 
secessionist governor and legislators, and created a unionist provisional 
government, the three judges of the Missouri Supreme Court, all of whom 
were southern in sympathy, resigned rather than take the loyalty oath required 
of all state officeholders.
155
  They were promptly replaced by three reliable, 
but conservative, Union men—Barton Bates, William V.N. Bay, and John 
D.S. Dryden
156—who also won a special election in November 1863 to keep 
their seats.
157
  During the war, overt southern sympathizers being either in 
exile, fighting for the Confederacy, or disqualified from public life by the 
loyalty oath, the state‘s political hierarchy was divided between Conservative 
and Radical unionists.  The latter gained control of the state convention in 
1865.  Anticipating opposition to emancipation and other measures thought 
necessary as the war drew to a close, they pushed through an ordinance 
ousting all the judicial officers in the state, with the vacant offices to be filled 
by gubernatorial appointment.
158
  Governor Fletcher appointed David Wagner, 
Walter L. Lovelace, and Nathaniel Holmes to the vacancies, though Judges 
Bay and Dryden had to be arrested and forcibly removed from the supreme 
court bench before the transition could be effected.
159
 
Despite all the turmoil, the court kept churning out opinions, civil and 
criminal, throughout the war at only slightly less than its usual pace.  It issued 
eight criminal opinions in 1861, thirteen in 1862, eight in 1863, fifteen in 
1864, and fourteen in 1865.  There are some indications that local legal 
institutions were understandably reluctant to be too aggressive in pursuing 
perpetrators of personal violence in a period dominated by bushwhacking and 
 
155. D.A. Divilbiss, The Ousting of the Judges, 1 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 1, 2 (1986).  
William Scott, William B. Napton, and Ephraim B. Ewing resigned.  Id. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 3.  See also State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279, 279 (1865) (discussing the ousting 
ordinance in relation to the elected recorder of St. Louis County). 
159. Divilbiss, supra note 155, at 4–5. 
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revenge killing.
160
  But in reading the substance of the supreme court‘s 
decisions, one would almost never have known there was a war on.  Other 
than a few cases relating to the administration of loyalty oaths,
161
 perhaps the 
most notable clue that something was amiss was the delay in rendering 
decisions.
162
 
When the war ended, however, changes in the judicial system followed 
thick and fast.  A new state constitution adopted in 1865 reinstituted the same 
three-judge supreme court, but also created district courts of appeals, to be 
composed of panels of circuit court judges.
163
  These intermediate courts were 
apparently unpopular and were abolished in 1870.
164
  However, in 1872 the 
membership of the supreme court was increased to five, and the constitutional 
amendment of 1890 increased it to seven; an earlier constitutional amendment 
in 1884 authorized three intermediate courts of appeals to sit in different 
sections of the state.
165
  The courts of appeals had jurisdiction over all appeals 
from felony convictions.
166
 
The result of these changes, in combination with the restoration of civil 
order and the growth in the state‘s population and industrial and commercial 
base,
167
 was a rapid increase in the incidence of criminal appeals.  By 1875, 
the five-member Missouri Supreme Court was deciding nearly forty criminal 
appeals per year.  The increase in both its civil and criminal docket was so 
great that, by the mid-1870s, the court‘s docket was two years behind.168  The 
addition of the courts of appeals authorized by the 1875 constitution pushed 
the number of criminal appeals above fifty annually.
169
  By 1885, the number 
 
160. In Boone County, for example, it is said that one judge ―held court in Columbia several 
times during the Civil War . . . with two pistols buckled around his waist.  Although it was known 
that men were being killed, houses burned and property stolen, it was considered best not to indict 
nor even to investigate.  Circuit court was adjourned for one whole year during this war.‖  GENTRY, 
supra note 1, at 266. 
161. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, 263 (1865) (concerning charges that a pastor 
had carried on his ministering trade without taking the required loyalty oath). 
162. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 36 Mo. 394, 394 (1865) (deciding an appeal arising from an 
1859 receiving stolen goods indictment); State v. Jenkins, 36 Mo. 372, 374 (1865) (resolving issues 
in an 1862 robbery). 
163. Hyde, supra note 61, at 4. 
164. Id. at 5. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. 1 Mo. App. at v. (1877). 
169. In 1876, Missouri appellate courts decided fifty-six criminal appeals, seventy-five in 1877, 
fifty-one in 1878, and fifty-two in 1879.  By 1885, the number of criminal appeals reached sixty-
four.  Interestingly, the addition of the courts of appeals does not seem to have materially reduced the 
supreme court‘s overall backlog.  In January 1883, the Court had 1,404 undecided cases on its 
docket.  Norwin D. Houser, Missouri Supreme Court Commissioners, 1882–1885 and 1911–1982, 
1 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 2 (1986). 
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of criminal appellate decisions reached sixty-four, and the advent of a 
statewide system of shorthand reporters in 1887
170
 seems to have had its 
effect, as well, with the number of annual decisions exceeding eighty in 1888 
and succeeding years. 
The new fashion for criminal appellate practice did not leave our friends 
in Boone County entirely behind.  In around 1869, a Hallsville, Missouri, 
physician, Dr. Thomas H. Keene, got into a dispute with one Peter Evans,
171
 
who, for reasons lost to history, was violently angry that Keene was engaged 
to marry a niece of Evans‘ wife.172  So enraged was Evans that ―he violently 
assaulted [Keene] with a pistol and knife, and swore that he would kill him, 
and that nothing but his blood would satisfy him.‖173  Although Keene 
escaped, ―Evans renewed his threats; declared that he would make no 
compromise in reference to the matter; that he would kill defendant on sight, 
if it was the last act of his life.  These threats were communicated to defendant 
the same evening.‖174  The next day, Keene encountered Evans again, 
whereupon Evans repeated his determination to kill Keene.  Evans was 
struggling with some other men who were trying to restrain him, when Keene 
shot and killed him.  Keene was charged with second-degree murder.  He 
retained Odon Guitar.  At trial, the evidence of Evans‘ prior threats to kill 
Keene was excluded, and despite the no-doubt-stirring oratory of Guitar on 
his behalf, Keene was convicted and sentenced to sixteen years in the 
penitentiary.
175
 
Once again, Guitar was not surrendering without fighting all the way to 
the top.  Whether because of his own increased appellate experience
176
 or the 
changed Missouri legal environment or simply having better facts, Guitar 
accomplished for Keene what he and Rollins could not for John Chapman.  
Guitar first appealed to the newly created district court of appeals, but 
apparently was unable to secure an opinion before that court was abolished in 
1870.
177
  He then brought an appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, arguing 
that exclusion of the prior threat evidence was error.  The court agreed and 
 
170. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
171. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 237–38. 
172. State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 357, 358 (1872). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 358–59. 
176. Beginning around 1860, with an interruption caused by the war, Guitar and his partners 
had started to appear more regularly in appeals.  See, e.g., Keene v. Barnes, 29 Mo. 377 (1860); 
Williams v. Christian Female Coll., 29 Mo. 250 (1860); Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389 (1860); 
Singleton v. Boone County Home Mut. Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 250 (1870); Hume v. Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145 
(1870); Mathews v. Switzler, 46 Mo. 301 (1870); Head v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 47 Mo. 220 
(1871). 
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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reversed the conviction.
178
  Armed with the excluded evidence, Guitar won 
the retrial and Keene walked free.
179
  In a macabre postscript, in 1876, on 
almost exactly the same spot where Keene killed Evans, Keene himself was 
shot and killed by another Hallsville physician named Benjamin Austine as a 
result of a dispute over an anonymous circular letter.  Austine hired Guitar, 
who secured his acquittal for the murder of Guitar‘s former client, this time 
without recourse to an appeal.
180
 
 
178. State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 357, 358, 361 (1872). 
179. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 238. 
180. Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
I have indulged in this antiquarian excursion into nineteenth-century 
criminal practice with the entirely frivolous aim of trying to inhabit, at least 
for awhile, the world of my professional predecessors in the little town where 
I live.  I wasn‘t seeking, and can‘t say I found, any profound lessons or deep 
insights.  But if forced to stretch for some generalizations about what I have 
learned, I might offer two. 
First, it is striking to realize the degree to which our modern American 
legal system depends on the existence of a complex physical and intellectual 
infrastructure—a body of existing case law covering a broad range of topics 
reproduced in a form quickly and easily accessible to lawyers, courthouse 
buildings sheltering judges and books so the one can find the other when 
required, a cadre of court reporters to generate the verbatim transcripts from 
which appellate arguments are woven, and so forth—that we take for granted, 
but which took decades to create on the American frontier.  The absence of 
any of element of this infrastructure narrows the scope and changes the style 
of appellate review.  And restricted appellate oversight in turn alters the 
nature of trial practice.  If there is any practical lesson to be drawn from this 
observation, it might be in the international realm.  The experience of 
nineteenth-century Missouri suggests that those seeking to foster the rule of 
law in the developing world must learn patience with systems which, despite a 
patina of modernity, may operate in ways not much different than 1850s 
Boone County. 
Second, we should, on balance, be deeply thankful for the well-developed 
system of criminal appeals we now possess.  The availability to every 
defendant of at least one thorough second look over the facts and legal rulings 
that produced his conviction is an indispensable element of a fair system of 
criminal justice.  That said, I am left to wonder just a little bit.  Old-time 
Missouri criminal appeals in the bill-of-exceptions era necessarily focused on 
the big stuff.  Major errors of law.  Manifest failures by the government to 
prove its case.  The system relied on trial judges, lawyers, and local juries to 
sort out everything else.  And, always assuming the availability of at least one 
appeal to look carefully and impartially at the big questions, I am not sure this 
approach is inferior to our own. 
Years ago, when I was a working prosecutor and long before I became an 
academic, I started to write my very first law review article goaded by a 
Colorado appellate decision that found a prosecutor‘s characterization of a 
defendant‘s testimony as ―lies‖ to be misconduct.  I never finished the article 
(which was probably just as well), but the sense of annoyed wonderment 
remains that appellate judges would seriously contemplate forcing lawyers, 
trial judges, juries, witnesses, and victims to retry a case due to a choice of 
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words that did not comport with the appellate bench‘s elevated sense of verbal 
decorum.
181
  Just before going off to attend the symposium on which this issue 
of the law review is based, I came across a scholarly paper that took as its 
starting point the rulings of a few trial judges across the country banning the 
use in court by witnesses and counsel of assertedly inflammatory terms such 
as ―victim,‖ ―rape,‖ ―homicide,‖ ―drunk,‖ ―murderer,‖ ―killer,‖ and ―crime 
scene.‖182  The article reports the results of an empirical study attempting to 
determine whether use of the word ―victim‖ to describe victims affects trial 
outcomes.
183
  While not even the author of this paper maintains that the use of 
such words is a big issue in many courts, for a modern legal academic—and 
obviously for some judges—minute scrutiny of the potential deleterious trial 
impact of participant word choices does not seem altogether strange. 
I strongly suspect that James Rollins and Odon Guitar would have thought 
everyone involved in such discussions—judges, lawyers, academics, the lot—
completely mad.  And I suspect they would have felt at least considerable 
puzzlement over a great many other abstruse issues that now consume the 
attention of the criminal appellate bench and bar.  I would not want to live 
under the Missouri system of the mid-1800s, particularly if I were a 
defendant, and even more particularly if I were non-white.  But I am not 
entirely sure that in the vast majority of cases our incredibly intricate, detail-
obsessed appellate process is any better at doing substantial justice than the 
courts of old Missouri.  So, with all their flaws, I lift a glass to the shades of 
Rollins and Guitar, Lancaster and Herndon, Williams and Prewitt haunting, as 
I imagine they do, the courthouses that were once their stages and whispering 
eloquent closing speeches to rapt spectral throngs. 
 
 
181. The ―liar‖ controversy lingers.  See, e.g., Claire Gagnon, Note, A Liar by Any Other 
Name? Iowa’s Closing Argument Conundrum, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 471 (2007). 
182. Christopher Terranova, Loaded Words in the Courtroom 2 & n.4 (May 12, 2009) (working 
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1403627. 
183. Id. at 3. 
